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The European approach to recognising, downgrading, and erasing same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad*• 
Guido Noto La Diega, Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University 
 
This chapter analyses how European countries that provide some protection for same-sex couples (e.g. 
civil partnerships, but not marriage) deal with same-sex marriages celebrated abroad. In this respect, 
there are three models: recognition, downgrading, and erasure. Recognition means that these 
marriages are recognised as marriages, either for all purposes, or for some of them, e.g. for the exercise 
of EU freedoms. Romania is the case study, because Coman – the CJEU case that provides a basis for 
the recognition model – concerned a Romanian case and therefore it is important to see how Member 
States implement the CJEU’s ruling. ‘Downgrading’ is the model whereby foreign marriages are 
treated as national civil partnerships. This is based on Orlandi and therefore Italy is the chosen case 
study. Hungary, finally, represents the ‘erasure’ model whereby same-sex marriages celebrated abroad 
are not even recognised as civil partnerships. These models are criticised from an EU law, European 
human rights law, and private international law perspective. 
 
1. Introduction 
Whereas in Europe the right to enter into a same-sex marriage has not been fully recognised,1 it is 
becoming increasingly clear that LGBTQ+ peoples’ right to see one’s existing marriage recognised 
abroad is part of ‘the very essence of the international right to marry.’2 In the last two years, there has 
been an unprecedented move towards a stronger protection of same-sex couples who cross borders.3 
First, in Orlandi v Italy,4 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated that same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad must be recognised at least as civil partnerships, even when a country decides not to 
allow such marriages to be celebrated within its territory. In the EU, a step forward was then made by 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in Coman,5 which decided that parties to a same-sex marriage 
are ‘spouses’ even in Member States (MS) that do not allow this marriage within their territory. The 
ratio decidendi was that national policies cannot justify a violation of the fundamental EU freedoms, 
                                                          
*A previous version of this chapter has been presented at the Journal of Private International Law Conference 
2017 (Rio de Janeiro); Conference on the Future of European Private Law (Ricadi); and at Universidad 
Internacional SEK Ecuador (Quito). Thanks to Adrian Coman, Liis Valk, Tamás Dombos, Dimitra Kamarinou, 
Eva Gračanin, Thomas Nigg, Reimo Mets, Andrej Havko, Vlad Viski, Elpida Amoiridou, Giuseppe Zago, Daria 
Onitiu, and the reviewers for helpful comments to a previous draft. 
• Peer-reviewed. Approved by Northumbria University’s Faculty of Business and Law Ethics Committee (ref. 
15869). 
1 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010). 
2 Kees Waaldijk, ‘The Gender-Neutrality of the International Right to Marry: Same-Sex Couples May Still Be 
Excluded from Marriage, But Their Exclusion – And Their Foreign Marriages – Must Be Recognised’, in Andreas 
R. Ziegler (ed), International LGBTI Law - Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law from an International-
Comparative Perspective (forthcoming). 
3 In this chapter, ‘foreign’, ‘celebrated abroad’, and ‘cross border’ are synonyms. A more adequate, albeit 
cumbersome, expression would be ‘same-sex marriages with transnational relevance.’ The usual phrases will be 
preferred for readability purposes. 
4 Orlandi v Italy Apps nos 26431/12; 26742/12; 44057/12 and 60088/12 (ECtHR, 14 December 2017). 




e.g. free movement of people and relevant residence rights.6 Against this backdrop, this chapter analyses 
those countries that provide some protection for same-sex couples (e.g. civil partnerships), without 
allowing them to marry. The author found that the models that countries adopt when dealing with same-
sex marriages celebrated abroad are recognition, downgrading, and erasure. Recognition means that 
these marriages are recognised as marriages, either for all purposes, or for some of them, e.g. for the 
exercise of EU freedoms. Romania is the case study of this model, because Coman7 – the legal basis of 
the recognition model – concerned a Romanian case and therefore it is important to see how MS 
implement the CJEU’s ruling. ‘Downgrading’ is the second model: the foreign marriage is treated as if 
it were a national civil partnership. Italy is a good case study for this approach because the relevant 
model can be seen as based on Orlandi.8 Finally, the third model is ‘erasure’, where same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad are not even recognised as civil partnerships. An example of this is Hungary, where 
the Government justified the choice by saying that all other countries follow the Hungarian approach. 
This chapter refutes this justification and exposes its untenability. 
 
This author carried out twenty semi-structured interviews by email with lawyers representing parties in 
prominent relevant cases, lawyers engaged with local LGBTQ+ organisations, and police officers.9 
Email interviews created ‘space to think and time to talk.’10 These allowed the author to understand the 
relevant European and national laws and policies. Cases such as Orlandi and Coman show that in order 
to understand the national effects of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad, one needs to take – as this 
book does – an approach that integrates private international law, EU law, and human rights law. The 
focus of this chapter is on the European countries that do not provide same-sex marriage but offer some 
form of protection to same-sex couples, and in particular on Romania, Italy, and Hungary.11  
2. The recognition model and the power of the single market: same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad must be recognised as ‘marriages’ 
 
The ‘recognition’ model means that foreign same-sex marriages are recognised as marriages even 
though domestic law does not allow these marriages to be celebrated in the territory of the relevant 
country. ‘Recognised’ encompasses both the recognition of all the effects of marriage, as well as the 
recognition of the status of ‘spouse’ for limited purposes, e.g. residence, impediment to marry, 
                                                          
6 The only national measures that can restrict the free movement and residence rights must be based on public 
policy, public security, or public health (Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77, art 27(1)). Public policy is ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’ (Case C-30/77 Regina v Pierre Bouchereau 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:172, para 4). In turn, public security is something ‘that might directly threaten the calm and 
physical security of the population as a whole or a large part of it’ (Case C-145/09 Land Baden-Württemberg v 
Panagiotis Tsakouridis ECLI:EU:C:2010:708). Such measures are subject to a ‘proportionality’ test and must be 
based ‘exclusively’ on the ‘personal conduct’ of the individual (art 27(2)). 
7 ibid. 
8 Orlandi (n 4). 
9 In qualitative research, participant selection should have a clear rational and purpose. Here I contacted the main 
LGBTQ+ organisations in the countries that fell within the scope of the research and they acted as gatekeepers 
introducing me to experts in the field. I selected twenty interviewees because I analysed 16 countries and some of 
the interviewees were not able to answer all the questions. The number is not high, but qualitative research does 
not aim to represent the entire relevant population and offsets the limited quantity with a more intensive study of 
the sample. See Michelle Cleary, Jan Horsfall and Mark Hayter, ‘Data Collection and Sampling in Qualitative 
Research: Does Size Matter?’ (2014) 70 Journal of Advanced Nursing 473. 
10 Nalita James, ‘Using Email Interviews in Qualitative Educational Research: Creating Space to Think and Time 
to Talk’ (2016) 29 International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 150. 
11 The study of individual legal systems in order to shed light on more general issues of LGBTQ+ rights in Europe 




citizenship, and adoption.12 Examples of this are Romania, Estonia,13 Slovakia,14 Latvia,15 and 
Andorra.16  
 
This model is based on the  CJEU’s seminal decision in Coman.17 Building on  Croatia,18 where it was 
decided that excluding same-sex couples from family reunification breaches the ECHR,19 Coman 
stressed that it is crucial to recognise these foreign spouses as such, and not downgrade them to generic 
family members,20 because the spouses’ rights to move and reside freely in the EU cannot be limited 
by national laws, whereas they can when it comes to partners.21 The Romanian General Inspectorate for 
Immigration denied a residence permit to a Romanian man’s American husband because the Civil Code 
expressly prohibits both the celebration of same-sex marriages in Romania and their recognition if 
celebrated abroad.22 Local authorities interpreted this as meaning that Romania would adopt the erasure 
model. This is not the case, as convincingly stated by the  CJEU. First, previous case law already 
harmonised the concept of ‘spouse’, that is ‘a person joined to another person by the bonds of 
marriage.’23 Since ‘person’ is gender-neutral, it can cover same-sex spouses.24 Second, in exercising 
any national competence – including the regulation of personal status – MS ‘must comply with EU 
law,’25 which includes the freedom to reside in any MS according to secondary EU rules.26 Third, 
interferences with the fundamental freedom to reside are allowed only if based on objective public-
interest considerations and if they are proportionate to a legitimate national objective.27 This is where 
the ‘societal objection’ comes into play. The Court accepted that the EU must respect national identities, 
some of which include a heterosexual view of marriage.28 However, it held that for the objection to be 
successful there must be ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society,’29 
which was not the case. The conclusion was that ‘spouses’ must be treated as such, regardless of their 
sexual orientation and gender. Even though the decision concerned the right to residence, Coman is 
                                                          
12 These are the aspects considered in Kees Waaldijk (ed), ‘More and more together: Legal family formats for 
same-sex and different-sex couples in European countries – Comparative analysis of data in the LawsAndFamilies 
Database’ (2017) 75 Families and Societies Working Paper Series 1. 
13 Private International Law Act (Rahvusvahelise eraõiguse seadus), arts 55-56, and Aliens Act 2009 
(Välismaalaste seadus), arts 118(1) and 137.  
14 A visible effect of Coman (n 5) has been the change of policy in Slovakia where, right after the publication of 
the Court of Justice’s decision, the Government declared that his country would recognise same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad for free movement purposes.  
15 Constitutional Court of Latvia (Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa), 21 May 2016. 
16 Tribunal Superior de Justícia, Sala Administrativa, sentència No 108-2012. 
17 Coman (n 5). There are two pending Supreme Court cases on this issue. 
18 App no 47082/12 (ECtHR, 23 February 2016). Cf. Danielle Teutonico, ‘Pajic v. Croatia: the European Court 
of Human Rights continues the incremental trend towards equal legal recognition of same-sex couples’ (2017) 25 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 461 
19 ECHR, arts 8 and 14. The CJEU build on Pajic but goes beyond it. Freedom of movement is not part of the 
ratio decidendi in Pajic, but, as will be argued below, its importance in the context of Coman may bring to the 
recognition of same-sex marriages for all purposes, and not just for residence purposes. 
20 However, according to Andy Hayward, ‘Relationships with Status: Civil Partnership in an Era of Same-Sex 
Marriage’, in this Book, civil partnerships have their own symbolic value. 
21
 Directive 2004/38/EC, art 2(2)(b). 
22
 Codul civil al României, art 277(2), incorrectly referred to in Coman (n 5) [8] as art 227. 
23 Coman, ibid [34], that refers to C-127/08 Metock and Others ECLI:EU:C:2008:449. 
24 Coman, ibid [35]. 
25 ibid [38]. 
26 C-148/02 Garcia Avello v The State of Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2003:539 
27 Coman (n 5) [40]. 
28 EU Treaty, art 4(2). 




likely to constitute a stepping-stone towards to full recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. Indeed, 
its ratio decidendi goes well beyond the right to residence, this being that MS ‘must comply with EU 
law, in particular the Treaty provisions on the freedom conferred on all Union citizens to move and 
reside’30 anywhere in the EU. Therefore, discriminatory marriage policies cannot be an excuse to breach 
the pillars of EU law, i.e. the four freedoms of movement and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (hereinafter ‘Charter’). Should Coman be interpreted narrowly, as merely the basis of a non-
discriminatory right to residence, the case would risk producing no practical effects. LGBTQ+ people 
are unlikely to exercise their free movement rights if equality31 and non-discrimination32 are not fully 
recognised.  
 
Arguably, Coman provided a foundation for the principle of continuity of personal status,33 whereby, 
in a context of increasingly geographically fluid families, foreign statuses ‘will never be open to 
challenge by applying a different law.’34 However, it is being implemented very narrowly, as 
exemplified by Romania. In July 2018, the Constitutional Court applied Coman and stated that same-
sex spouses of EU citizens have the same residence rights as different-sex ones.35 The Court observed 
that same-sex couples have the ‘right to private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 
7 of Charter, and their relationship is recognised by the law.’36  
 
Despite these bold general statements, the Court did not go so far as declaring the unconstitutionality 
of the Civil Code provision preventing the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages.37 The provision 
is still valid ‘as long as the Romanian authorities provide a framework to implement the EU decision in 
Coman.’38 It is unclear what this framework will look like and we can expect two years of litigation 
before the Romanian Coman case is settled,39 but the framework that will need to be in place will have 
to ensure freedom of movement rights to all spouses of EU citizens, without discrimination on the 
grounds of gender or sexuality. Implementing the spirit of the CJEU’s ruling should have meant going 
beyond the mere residence right to recognising the validity of foreign same-sex marriages for all 
purposes, but this is not surprising since the Constitutional Court ‘is hardly a champion of equal 
                                                          
30 ibid [38], italics added. 
31 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [2000] OJ C-364/01, art 20. (hereinafter “Charter”) 
32 Ibid, art 21. 
33 The principle had already be affirmed in other contexts, see Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg App no 
76240/01 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007) paras. 117 ff. and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy App no 25358/12 (ECtHR, 
24 January 2017), paras 150 ff. In the context of same-sex relationships, see Frances Hamilton and Lauren 
Clayton-Helm, ‘Same Sex Relationships Choice of Law and the Continued Recognised Relationship Theory’ 
(2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; Stuart M Davis, Conflicts of Law and the Mutual 
Recognition of Same-Sex Unions in the EU (PhD Thesis, University of Reading 2015) and, in private international 
law in general, see Toni Marzal Yetano, ‘The Constitutionalisation of Party Autonomy in European Family Law’ 
(2010) 6 Journal of Private International Law 158. From an EU law perspective, with a focus on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, art 9, see Massimo Condinanzi and Chiara Amalfitano, ‘La libera circolazione 
della “coppia” nel diritto comunitario’ (2008) 13 Dir EU 399. A more nuanced version was proposed by Vincenzo 
Scalisi, ‘«Famiglia» e «famiglie» in Europa’ [2013] Riv dir civ 8. 
34 Yetano (n 33) 185. On the compatibility of the portability principle and the recognition method in conflicts of 
law see Silvia Pfeiff, La portabilité du statut personnel dans l’espace européen (Bruylant 2017).  
35 Constituţională a României, decizia 18 July 2018 no 534. 
36 ibid. 
37 Codul civil al României, art 277(2). 
38 Curtea Constituţională a României, decizia 18 July 2018 no 534. 
39 After ibid, the case went back to a first instance court in Bucharest and should the decision be favourable the 




rights.’40 Such interpretation arguably does not comply with EU Law, because if same-sex marriage is 
not recognised for all purposes LGBTQ+ people are unlikely to exercise the residence rights, as 
suggested by the fact that the Coman-Hamilton family still lives in the US.  
 
Considering the unfavourable attitude of the majority of the Romanian population towards LGBTQ+ 
rights,41 one could have expected that the recognition of same-sex marriages by means of a judicial 
decision imposed by the CJEU would prompt a backlash. Instead, in October 2018, a three-year 
campaign aimed at changing the Constitution to expressly refer to marriage as the union between a man 
and a woman42 resulted in a referendum that failed43 because only 20.4% of the citizens voted and the 
quorum was not obtained.44 Coman may produce legal45 and societal changes going beyond mere 
residence rights.46 The opportunity may present itself with one of the four civil partnerships bills to the 
floor of the Romanian parliament and most political leaders declared to be in favour of the recognition 
of same-sex couples.47 Interestingly, ‘the only non-controversial provision in the bills’48 is that foreign 
same-sex marriages should be treated as civil partnerships. However, any such downgrading would be 
in breach of the ratio decidendi in Coman, i.e. ensuring that same-sex couples feel free to circulate in 
all MS without their rights and status being in danger.49 
 
For some years now, private international law scholars have wondered whether ‘a refusal by a [Member] 
State to acknowledge the marriage or partnership status of a same-sex couple [is or is not] compatible 
with EU law or human rights.’50 Now we know, on the one hand, that EU law requires all spouses to be 
treated in the same way to ensure free movement of people.51 On the other hand, the ECtHR decided in 
                                                          
40 Elena Brodeala, ‘Paying Lip Service to the CJEU: The Unsurprising Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Romania in the Coman Case’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 26 July 2018) <ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/paying-lip-service-
to-the-cjeu-the-unsurprising-decision-of-the-constitutional-court-of-romania-in-the-coman-case/> accessed 12 
March 2019. 
41 The last available data from 2017 suggests that 74% of the Romanian population is against same-sex marriage 
(Pew Research Center, Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, 
and Key Social Issues (Pew 2018) 12). According to an interviewee, this attitude depends on the importance of 
the Orthodox Church and on the delay with which Romania decriminalised homosexuality: in 1996, a lesbian 
woman was imprisoned for three years for her sexuality and the decriminalisation law was passed only in 2001. 
42 The Lege de revizuire a Constituţiei României 2018 amended the Constitution, art 48, in order to include an 
express reference to marriage as the union between a man and a woman and called for a referendum to approve 
the amendment. 
43 On the reasons of the failure, see Valerie Hopkins, ‘Romanian voters ignore referendum on same-sex marriage 
ban’ (Financial Times, 7 October 2018) <www.ft.com/content/9bbcf3ce-ca62-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956> 
accessed 10 March 2019. 
44 The referendum campaign started in 2015, well before the Coman ruling, but after the national lawsuit that 
ultimately led to Coman was initiated (2013). However, the lawsuit became public on 19 July 2016, one day 
before the first hearing at the Constitutional Court.  
45 So far, there have not been meaningful legal changes, but Hungarian MPs have used Coman to justify the 
introduction of civil partnerships in recently presented bill.  
46 According to one of the interviewees, there has already been a positive change in societal attitudes towards 
LGBTQ+ people, with even conservative Romanian media giving positive visibility to the case. 
47 This data emerged from the interviews and suggests that Romanian laws may change more rapidly than 
Romanian society. 
48 Email from Viski to Author (4 March 2019). 
49 Since the next 48 months will see Romanian politicians busy with several electoral campaigns, it seems unlikely 
that civil unions will be at the top of the public agenda. 
50 Davis (n 33) 37. 




Orlandi52 and Oliari53 that states must protect same-sex relationships and cannot erase foreign same-
sex marriages. 
 
Finally, it is not by chance that the most advanced decision on foreign same-sex marriages is based on 
the need to preserve the single market. The convergence between LGBTQ+ rights and capitalism has 
been convincingly argued by sexuality scholars.54 For example, Mario Mieli noted that ‘contemporary 
gay movements originated in those countries where the capital reached the stage of real subsumption.’55 
The moment at which LGBTQ+ rights are asserted is congruent with capital's dominion, control and 
transformation of all social relations and modes of production.56 Economic modernisation is a key factor 
that motivates the introduction of LGBTQ+ rights in legislation.57 Where the queer58 fled the family 
unit at the turn of the twentieth century; the LGBTQ+ subject, freshly endowed with rights, returns as 
a productive member at the turn of the noughties.59 Moreover, Mieli’s pages provide further support to 
the idea that recognising the right to residence of all spouses is enough to achieve the freedoms of 
movement and the rights to equality, dignity, and non-discrimination as enshrined in the Charter. 
Indeed, despite the fact that in ‘most capitalist countries, the freedom to be homosexual is recognized 
as a right (…) such legal freedom means freedom to be excluded, oppressed, repressed, ridiculed, 
become victims of moral and physical violence, and be isolated into ghettos.’60 This is also linked to 
Foucault’s idea of using freedom, or the illusion thereof, as a device of power. Accordingly, he argued 
that the ‘freedom of circulation, in the broad sense of the term [is] one of the facets, aspects, or 
dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses of security.61 In order for societies to change and avoid 
                                                          
52 Orlandi (n 4). 
53 Oliari and others v Italy, App Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 
54 See Mario Mieli, Elementi di critica omosessuale (Einaudi 1977), translated to English as Towards a gay 
communism (tr David Fernbach and Evan Calder Williams, Pluto 2018), and John d’Emilio, ‘Capitalism and gay 
identity’ in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharan Thompson (eds), Powers of Desire: The Politics of 
Sexuality (Monthly Review Press 1983) 100. 
55 Mieli (n 54) 9.  
56 Mieli refers to Marx’s categories of formal and real subsumption. In early capitalism, there is only a formal 
subsumption of labour by capital, which means that the labour process is not directly affected but the worker’s 
submission is a consequence of the capitalist’s control over the means of production. The following stage of ‘real 
subsumption’ refers to when the capitalist mode of production changes the nature itself of labour and its 
conditions. Mieli (n 54) 9 refers to Karl Marx, Il capitale: Libro I (La Nuova Italia 1969) ch 6. For a critical 
reading of these concepts and their interpretations see Sandro Mezzadra, ‘The Topicality of Prehistory: A New 
Reading of Marx's Analysis of “So-called Primitive Accumulation”’ (2011) 23 Rethinking Marxism 302, 313 ff. 
57 Phillip M Ayoub, ‘Contested norms in new- adopter states: International determinants of LGBT rights 
legislation’ (2015) 21 EJIR 293, 297. 
58 Queer here is not used as an umbrella term for LGBTQ+ people: it characterises the radical queer that rebels 
against both the heteronormative and homonormative societies. See e.g. Sandra Jeppesen, ‘Queer anarchist 
autonomous zones and publics: Direct action vomiting against homonormative consumerism’ (2010) 13 
Sexualities 463. 
59 This is consistent with D’Emilio (n 54), who suggests that capitalism reorganises the traditional model of family, 
making men travel in search of external sources for their families’ subsistence; thanks to said mobility, new sexual 
relations could be pursued relatively freely. See also Jeffrey Weeks, Coming out: homosexual politics in Britain 
from the nineteenth century to the present (rev ed, Quartet 1990) on parallels between regulation of homosexuality 
and regulation of the working class. Others have noted that the ‘penetration of the market deeper into everyday 
life has created spaces for commodified forms of lesbian and gay existence’ (Alan Sears, ‘Queer Anti-Capitalism: 
What’s Left of Lesbian and Gay Liberation?’ (2005) 69 Science & Society 92). 
60 Mario Mieli, ‘Per la critical della questione omosessuale’ (1972) 3 Fuori! 1-2, as cited by Massimo Prearo, 
‘Introduction’, in Mieli (n 54) xvii. 
61 Michel Foucault, ’18 January 1978’ in Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana (eds), 




ghettos, mere residence rights are not enough and, accordingly, narrow interpretations of Coman must 
be avoided. 
 
3. A second-best solution: downgrading foreign same-sex marriages to civil partnerships 
 
Most countries that do not recognise same-sex marriages celebrated abroad as marriages follow the 
‘downgrading’ model.62 They treat these marriages as if they were civil partnerships, regulated either 
by foreign law, or by the domestic law. These countries include Italy, Northern Ireland,63 San Marino,64 
Switzerland,65 Croatia,66 Greece,67 Liechtenstein,68 Cyprus,69 and Slovenia.70 The legal foundation of 
this model is Orlandi,71 where it was decided that when a couple’s situation corresponds to family life 
– and same-sex married couples fall within the scope – States that do not put in place legal safeguards 
for these relationships are in breach of the right to private and family life.72 Although the divergence 
between law and society was not the ratio decidendi in Orlandi, the Court did note that the contracting 
country ‘failed to take account of the social reality of the situation.’73 However, the societal argument 
in this case was presented as a predominantly negative force against LGBTQ+ rights. Indeed, on the 
one hand, the lack of consensus around same-sex marriage justified the non-adoption of the recognition 
model.74 On the other hand, the societal argument seems the main thread in the dissenting opinion. 
There, it was observed that societal changes, even when occurring in all the parties to the Convention, 
do not alter the scope of the parties’ engagements,75 and that societal changes and citizens’ needs do 
not entail human rights under the Convention.76 The underlying political agenda is evident and 
exemplified by the dissenting opinion culminating with a quote from conservative judge Scalia: ‘no 
social transformation without representation.’77 From this, one can infer that the societal argument is a 
dangerous one: it prevents the full protection of LGBTQ+ rights, and it can be distorted to discriminate 
against minorities.78 
 
Italy is a useful case study from this book’s perspective, because despite Italian society being largely 
accepting of a plurality of family forms and of LGBTQ+ rights,79 Italy has been the last Western 
                                                          
62 Following Hayward (n 20), the recognition as national civil partnerships could be seen as a change in name but 
not necessarily a ‘downgrade.’ 
63 Since same-sex marriage has not been legalised, Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) [25] still 
applies. 
64 Legge 20 November 2018, art 3(4).  
65 Federal Law on Private International Law of 18 December 1987, art 45(3). 
66 Life Partnership Act, arts 73, 74 and 75. See Pajic (n 18). 
67 Civil Partnership Act no 4356 of 2015. 
68 Registered Partnership Act of 16 March 2011 and the Registered Partnership Decree of 16 August 2011.  
69 Civil Union Act 2015 (L. 184(I)/2015), s 43. 
70 The Civil Union Act 2016, art 6(4). 
71 Orlandi (n 4).  
72 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art 8; Orlandi (n 4) paras 209-211. 
73 Orlandi (n 4) para 209. 
74 Orlandi (n 4). 
75 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek: Orlandi (n 4) para 2. 
76 Ibid, para 4. 
77 Ibid, para 14. 
78 As noted by Mulder (n 11) 271, the various ideologically influenced approaches to equality law explain the 
difficulties in its harmonisation. 





European country to recognise same-sex relationships. It did so in 2016 with the Civil Unions Act,80 
which introduced the civil partnerships following the ECtHR’s decision against Italy in Oliari.81 The 
Court stated that in light of the growing European consensus around the recognition of same-sex 
relationships and because of the conflict between an accepting society and silence of the law, the 
absence of a legal framework recognising same-sex relationships violated the right to respect for private 
and family life.82 A key element of the implementation framework was a decree on private international 
issues that opted for the downgrading principle, though with the caveats explained below.83 Even though 
the Italian Parliament asked the Government to pass a decree whereby same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad were regulated by the Italian rules on civil unions, the Government adopted a more nuanced and 
favourable approach, with different rules applying to Italian couples and couples of Italians and 
foreigners on the one hand, and couples of foreigners on the other hand.  
 
With couples where at least one spouse is Italian, the marriage will be downgraded to a civil union and 
the applicable law will be the Italian Civil Unions Act Italian.84 The downgrading would already be 
problematic if it produced the ‘mere’ loss of the name ‘marriage,’ without practical effects. In Italy, 
however, the differences between marriage and civil unions are both symbolic and substantive,85 the 
main ones being that civil partners do not have a duty of fidelity,86 and cannot adopt.87 The main ratio 
of such downgrading is to ‘prevent elusive behaviours of Italian citizens who go abroad to marry with 
the purpose of circumventing Italian law.’88 Therefore, same-sex marriages celebrated abroad between 
foreigners will be recognised in Italy as marriages, as opposed to downgraded to civil unions.89 
Reflecting on the anti-elusive rationale of the downgrading rule, arguably same-sex marriages should 
be recognised and not downgraded whenever it is not celebrated to circumvent Italian law. One could 
contend90 that when couples of different nationalities marry abroad, they are not trying to circumvent 
the Italian ban on same-sex marriage; accordingly, the anti-elusive rationale of the downgrading rule 
should not apply and, therefore, their marriage should not be downgraded. Similarly, it could be said 
that the downgrading provision should apply only to marriages where both parties are Italian citizens 
                                                          
80 Legge 20 May 2016 no 76 ‘Regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disciplina delle 
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81 Oliari (n 53) para 178 and passim. 
82 ECHR, art 8. 
83 Decreto legislativo 19 January 2017 no 7 ‘Modifiche e riordino delle norme di diritto internazionale privato 
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and reside in Italy; should any of these elements vary (e.g. an Italian couple genuinely resident abroad), 
the application of the Civil Unions Act would be unwarranted.91 However, the Supreme Court did not 
follow this reasoning and applied the downgrading provision to all same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad, with the sole exception of those couples where both spouses are foreigners.92  
 
Another critique that can be moved to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision on couples of mixed 
nationality is that it downplays the increasing European consensus around same-sex marriage, thus 
clearly diverging from the case law of the ECtHR in Oliari93 and Orlandi.94 Third, and more 
importantly, the Supreme Court stresses that both human rights and constitutional case law state that 
lawmakers have discretion on the type of protection same-sex couples can access.95 However, the court 
inappropriately conflates the (indeed discretional) decision on whether or not to introduce same-sex 
marriage (right) and the simpler taking account of the effect of a marriage that has already happened 
and is fully effective in another State (status). Under Article 9, the right to marry can be limited only 
by national laws governing its exercise.96 In the event of the recognition, or lack thereof, of same-sex 
marriages celebrated abroad, the couple already exercised the right to marry and, accordingly, national 
restrictions should not apply. Statuses should be recognised in a non-discriminatory way.97 The 
difference between marriage as a right to be exercised and marriage as an already existing act is reflected 
in the different private international law rules that apply to the formalities of marriage and those that 
apply to the spouses’ capacity. On the one hand, there ‘is no rule more firmly established (…) that that 
which applies the maxim locus regit actum to the formalities of marriage,’98 which means that countries 
demand to retain full control on the exercise of the right to marry by a monopoly on the law applicable 
to the formalities of marriage. On the other hand, marriages that could not be celebrated within one’s 
territory (for example polygamous marriages), if they have been celebrated abroad, will be valid under 
private international law if contracted between parties of full capacity99 and pursuant to the foreign rules 
on formalities.100 
 
The argument could be reinforced by noting that the ‘downgrading’ model breaches other fundamental 
human rights that do not allow national exemptions, such as discrimination on ground of sexual 
orientation,101 equality,102 and freedom of movement and residence.103 This latter is likely to be the key 
to unlocking the recognition model. Despite Orlandi legitimising the ‘downgrading’ option, an 
argument can be made for the ‘recognition’ model. On the one hand, as done above, it can be shown 
how Orlandi and the Italian Supreme Court inadvertently conflated the celebration of marriage and 
                                                          
91 Garlatti (n 87) 442-443. 
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recognition of its effects. On the other hand, the  CJEU case law can prevail on that of the ECtHR. 
Indeed, the Charter expressly recognises that the Charter’s rights cannot restrict or adversely affect 
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised […] by Union law.’104 Therefore, the case law 
on free movement, and namely Coman, could prevail on Orlandi. Indeed, a major difference between 
the ECHR and EU-law is that ‘where the Convention sets out minimum standards, EU law sets the 
standard.’105 This is also a result of the Åkerberg106 case, that decided that the Charter is binding when 
states act within the scope of EU law, not only when they implement EU law, thus ultimately increasing 
‘judicial oversight by the CJEU in human rights affairs.’107 Even though Coman mandated the 
‘recognition’ model in a case regarding residence rights, an implementation that aspires to be true to 
the spirit of Coman and of the EU Treaties more generally should lead to the admission that, practically, 
same-sex married couples will not exercise their EU freedoms (to move, reside, work, etc.), if they 
know that their status will be in danger and they will be treated as second-class citizens. Therefore, the 
downgrading model arguably breaches EU Law (Coman) and human rights including freedom of 
movement, equality, and non-discrimination. 
  
4. The erasure of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad breaches both EU Law and 
European Human Rights Law. 
 
Alongside countries that recognise foreign same-sex marriages and countries that downgrade them to 
civil unions, a minority of countries adopt the erasure model, whereby perfectly valid same-sex 
marriages celebrated abroad do not produce any effects despite the virtual availability of civil unions to 
nationals. In Europe, this is the case of Hungary and Czech Republic,108 and is in direct breach of both 
EU Law and European human rights law as enshrined in Coman and Orlandi.  
 
In Hungary, as in most Eastern European countries,109 the majority of the population opposes same-sex 
marriages (64%). This, however, does not per se explain why Hungary adopts the erasure model, given 
that in other countries, the population is more strongly opposed to equal marriage and yet they recognise 
foreign same-sex marriages (Armenia) or downgrade them to civil partnerships (Greece).  
 
In 2018, a reform of Hungarian private international law came into force.110 A provision in the relevant 
bill provided for the downgrading of foreign same-sex marriages to registered partnerships,111 but it did 
not pass because the Government claimed that such a recognition is not 
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common in international private law.112 As demonstrated in this chapter, such an assertion is plainly not 
correct. Indeed, in most countries foreign same-sex marriages are effective either as marriages or as 
civil partnerships. 
 
The Hungarian case study is important also because it shows how Coman cannot be interpreted as 
meaning merely that residence rights must be recognised for same-sex spouses. Indeed, even before 
Coman, Hungarian authorities would grant spouses in same-sex marriages celebrated abroad a residence 
permit, without any clarification as to whether this was based on the recognition of the relationship as 
marriage, registered partnership, or cohabitation.113 Nonetheless, same-sex married couples are still 
fighting in court to be recognised at least as registered partners. A decision of a first instance court 
ordered the registration of a same-sex marriage as a registered partnership,114 and this was upheld on 
appeal. In January 2019, however, on further appeal by the Government, the Supreme Court quashed 
those rulings. Even though no provision prevents the recognition of same-sex marriages at least as 
registered partnerships, the Government referred to the lack of ad-hoc provision on downgrading and 
to the constitutional definition of marriage ‘as the union of a man and a woman.’115 Such argument is 
based on the conflation, criticised above, between allowing same-sex marriages to be celebrated within 
the national territory and the recognition of unions where the right to marry has already been exercised, 
namely through same-sex marriage celebrated abroad. When it comes to the former, the ‘right to marry’ 
applies and this is guaranteed only ‘in accordance with the national laws governing’116 its exercise;117 
conversely, in relation to the latter, freedoms of movement, dignity, and non-discrimination will apply 
and the exercise of these rights cannot be limited by national provisions. Therefore, national rules – 
including national constitutional bans on same-sex marriage – do not apply to marriages celebrated 
abroad, since the right to marry has already been exercised.  
 
To make one hopeful as to a positive outcome of the Hungarian dispute is the fact that the Supreme 
Court concluded that it was not possible to order the registration of foreign same-sex marriages as civil 
partnerships for the technical reason that the claimants asked for their relationship to be recognised as 
marriage, not as civil partnership. The parties have submitted a new request of recognition as civil 
partnership and, given the ‘technical grounds’118 on which the lower courts’ decisions were quashed, 
one can expect a positive outcome for this dispute and, accordingly, the adoption by Hungary of the 
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Despite a variety of approaches towards same-sex marriages celebrated abroad, there is a clear trend 
towards the recognition of their effects even in those countries where the society does not seem 
particularly favourable to LGBTQ+ rights.119 Nonetheless, there has not been that change in 
jurisprudence that would have been necessary for the ‘realization of universal Convention rights for gay 
men and lesbians.’120 The societal objection does not seem to play a great role in the decisions 
concerning foreign same-sex marriages, probably because the latter are perceived as less of a threat for 
society, compared to domestic same-sex marriages.  
 
Whilst ideologies and politics are not always explicitly present in the legal developments around cross-
border same-sex marriages, they still play an important role. For example, one of the few times that the 
societal argument has played a prominent role has been the dissenting opinion in Orlandi,121 where 
society and national identity have been used to serve a conservative legal agenda and to slow down the 
progress of LGBTQ+ rights. At the same time, where human rights failed (Orlandi), the free market 
succeeded (Coman). The fact that the ratio decidendi of the most advanced decision on same-sex 
marriages celebrated abroad is the unity of the single market is not accidental and speaks volumes about 
the convergence between LGBTQ+ rights and capitalism and the shift from radical queer to LGBTQ+ 
citizen and labourer. 
 
After Orlandi, the ‘erasure’ model must be ruled out because it is a direct breach of human rights law. 
The recognition model should be preferred to the downgrading one, despite the latter being legitimised 
by Orlandi. First, this decision can be criticised for conflating national same-sex marriages and foreign 
ones. The former falls under the right to marry under Article 8 of the Charter and national laws can limit 
its exercise. The latter concerns instances where the right to marry has already been exercised and, 
therefore, falls under rights to equality, non-discrimination, and free movements; for these rights, the 
Charter does not allow national exemptions. Second, under certain circumstances EU law can prevail 
on the ECHR law and, for the purposes of this chapter, this means that Coman can prevail on Orlandi. 
MS should not limit themselves to implement Coman as a mere obligation to open the right to residence 
to LGBTQ+ spouses: they should recognise the validity of foreign same-sex marriages for all purposes; 
otherwise, it is unlikely that a same-sex couple will move to a country where they would be legally free, 
but still members of a ghetto.  
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